6:15 p.m. in the southern Red Sea. The motor tanker Liberty Bay was moving on a course of 187° at 14 knots, standard speed for her type. The vessel, a medium-range product carrier, sailing under the flag of the United States. On board, 38,000 tons of jet A1 aviation fuel. Final destination, Singapore, where the fuel was to be transshipped for onward delivery to American military airfields in the Western Pacific. Contract, Military Sealift Command. The crew consisted of 22 people. Captain Robert Caldwell, 51, a US Merchant Marine veteran with 26 years of experience. Before going to sea, two private armed security contractors were added to the standard ship’s complement, former US Marines who had actively participated in combat operations.
The guards were armed with two Bushmaster XM15 carbines in semi-automatic configuration. This variant was not chosen by accident. The full-automatic version version is prohibited for private security contractors under international jurisdiction. They also carried one Remington 700 bolt-action rifle in .308 caliber with a Trijicon AccuPoint optic for engagements at 400-plus meters. Two carbines for primary fire, one rifle for taking out the skiff’s helmsman from a safe distance. Two days before approaching the high-risk area, the captain called the entire crew for a briefing. At 2:00 p.m., all 24 people came out on deck.
What began is what the industry calls, in short, hardening. The transformation of a civilian vessel into something that no longer looks like easy prey. First, they unrolled the coils, concertina razor wire, serpentine cut razor wire, NATO CK3 type with 22-mm blades on both sides of the strip. 40 coils, 30 m each. They laid it along the full length of the bull work on both sides from bow to stern, especially densely amidships where the freeboard due to the ship’s full load was only 4 and 1/2 meters. This is the most vulnerable section for boarding. The wire was fixed to the railing with steel cable and clamps and in parallel a second row at a height of 1 meter 20 above the first. Anyone trying to throw a grappling hook would catch the cable and pull himself onto the wire. Anyone who got through the first row would run into the second.
After 5 hours of work, the ship was fully wrapped in razor wire. Then dummies were placed on the deck. Old work coveralls stuffed with canvas with hard hats on top fitted with reflective stripes. They were positioned at observation points on the bridge wings near the gangway on the after deck. Through binoculars from 300 meters away, an ordinary lookout. This is a psychological trick. Pirates assessing a vessel before an attack are supposed to see more people on watch than there actually are. Internal preparation also played an important role. All deckhouse portholes were closed with armored shutters. The doors to the engine room were welded from the inside with additional steel plates.
The citadel, an armored compartment in the deckhouse on C deck with duplicated UKMTO lines, Inmarsat C satellite communications and a 96-hour supply of water, food and medical supplies. A backup engine control panel inside the citadel in case maneuvering became necessary without leaving the secure space. Preparations were completed at 11:40 p.m. By then the vessel was approaching the exit from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden. The captain declared full combat readiness. From that moment, the ship was running in anti-piracy lockdown mode. The deck empty except for the dummies, the crew only at critical posts, the security in a two-shift rotation, 1 hour of sleep at a time.
At 6:15 a.m., one of the guards on the port bridge wing fixes his binoculars on the horizon. 10 miles out, a small shadow is visible. A wooden dhow, about 25 m in length, with the characteristic Yemeni stern wheelhouse layout. Under normal conditions, a fisherman. But the dhow was holding a course that matched the course of Liberty Bay within 2°. That is not a fisherman and not a random crossing. 2 minutes later, behind the dhow, two smaller objects appeared. Fast skiffs with outboard motors. They were spreading out in a fan. One held position behind the mothership. The other had already broken off and was closing on an interception course. Speed estimated at 24 knots. A standard Somali pirate action group. A mother vessel plus two attacking skiffs. The classic two-pronged approach. One skiff from the bow, the other from the stern, to split the defenders’ fire.
Hawkins, one of the guards, pressed the intercom key. Rivers, the other guard, reached the bridge in 30 seconds with the rifle and two full magazines, 10 rounds each. Caldwell simultaneously pressed the UKMTO emergency button. The signal went out through Inmarsat C to the coordination center in Dubai. Then, instant retransmission to every military vessel within response range. The signal was received by USS Laboon, an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, hull number DDG-58, at that moment in the northern Gulf of Aden, 110 miles to the south. Aboard Laboon, the commanding officer sounded general quarters, and an MH-60R Seahawk with a spinning up on the flight deck. Estimated flight time to the incident point, about 35 minutes. 35 minutes that Liberty Bay would have have hold on her own.
Caldwell gave one command over the loudspeaker:
“Citadel.”
19 members of the crew left their stations and, following the rehearsed procedure, moved to the Citadel. 23 seconds and the doors locked from the inside, a four-point throw bolt. Five remained on deck. The captain and the second mate on the bridge for navigation and communications. The chief engineer at the engine control room console to hold the main engine at full ahead. And two former Marines for the fight.
The first skiff came within 800 m off the starboard side, five men on board. Standard composition, a helmsman, a grenadier with an RPG-7, three shooters with AK-47s. The skiff speed, 24 knots. The distance closing at 11 m per second. Time to the effective AK-47 fire envelope, 300 m. 45 seconds. Time to boarding distance, 75 seconds. Rivers took position on the starboard bridge wing behind a steel partition reinforced with additional steel plates. Hawkins moved aft with his carbine and six 30-round magazines. Distance, 600 m. Rivers began tracking the skiff in his scope. Point of aim, the helmsman, a figure with a distinctive head wrap at the rear of the boat. Distance, 500 m. Rivers fired at a distance of 410 m, one shot. The bullet struck its target directly and the skiff was damaged.
The boat instantly lost control. Its bow pitched up at an angle. The motor began churning water and the pirates on board lost their balance. Hawkins, from his aft position, simultaneously opened fire on the second skiff, which was coming in from the port side. The first bursts walked across the hull of the skiff and into the engine housing. The Yamaha 40 outboard on the stern of the second skiff took three hits to the cylinder block and one to the fuel tank. The motor died. The skiff drifted off at 16 knots, gradually slowing, swinging 90° off its attack course by inertia. The first skiff also ceased to be a threat. It was spinning in an arc, its motor running at maximum revolutions, but the thrust vector kept pushing it sideways.
After a minute, one of the pirates managed to crawl to the helm and straighten the course, back toward the mother dow. Two of those still active kept up chaotic AK-47 fire at the hull of Liberty Bay. The rounds left marks on the steel of the superstructure. One punched through a galley porthole and several more hit the netting without reaching the hull. Not a single hit on a person. The second skiff, with its motor dead, was at a distance of 280 m and drifting toward the ship by the inertia of the current and its own momentum. The four pirates on board started rowing frantically with a paddle, trying to get out of Hawkins’ line of fire. Rivers shifted his rifle to the second target. He did not fire. No further warning was needed. The pirates were clearly already trying to break off, not press the attack. Under the rules for use of force, private security is not permitted to open fire on an adversary who is demonstrating disengagement.
Caldwell changed course 30° to starboard and pushed the engine to 95% power, 15.2 knots. Liberty Bay began pulling away from both skiffs and the mother vessel. The dow turned to the southeast, toward the Yemeni coast in the area of the Gulf of Hadramaut. The engagement lasted 4 minutes 40 seconds. 17 rounds from Rivers’ rifle and 72 rounds from Hawkins’ carbine, the latter in three-round bursts. The number of wounded on the ship was zero. The number of wounded among the pirates was unknown.
6:42 p.m. On the horizon to the southeast, a distinctive shape appeared. An MH-60R Seahawk from USS Laboon. It took position above the drifting second skiff. 20 minutes later, Laboon herself came up. The rib team from the American destroyer detained the four pirates from the second skiff without resistance. The first skiff, with its hull punctured, had managed to reach the mother dow and get its crew aboard. The dow headed for Yemen. Laboon did not pursue. The four detainees were identified as Somali nationals.
Liberty Bay continued her voyage to Singapore. She arrived four days behind schedule due to the revised route, exiting through Bab el-Mandeb on a more southerly track, rounding the island of Socotra from the south, and then proceeding on a direct course.
Three conclusions from the episode. First, armed security on board remains the single most effective means of preventing a hijacking. Throughout the entire period of Somali piracy since 2008, no vessel with PCASP on board has been successfully hijacked. Liberty Bay confirmed the rule once again. Second, hardening, razor wire, netting, water cannons, dummies, is a critical component, but on its own it only slows the boarding. It does not stop it. Without active fire on the pirates at 400 m, all the netting and wire would have bought, by Trident Group estimates, an extra 6 to 8 minutes. Not enough time before Laboon’s arrival. Third, the naval assets of the coalition fleet still respond, but response time is 35 minutes in the best case, and 50 or more on average. In those 35 to 50 minutes, the ship is fighting for herself. From which follows the conclusion, armed security on board remains the single most effective means of preventing a hijacking.
