For decades, the mighty battleship ruled the waves. From the build-up to World War One until the outbreak of World War Two, these massive ships represented the pinnacle of naval power. But times change. Weapons systems evolve. And one such evolution brought the battleship’s long reign to an abrupt end in the opening years of WWII. Carrier-based naval aviation.

Often launched from aircraft carriers, dive bombers and torpedo bombers turned the battleship into a massive sitting duck. Navies became increasingly reliant on aircraft carriers to wage offensive operations rather than battleships. And the end of the battleship era was soon sealed in an epic 1945 battle, when hundreds of U.S. aircraft overwhelmed the Japanese Yamato, one of the largest battleships ever built. The Yamato was lost, and the battleship was rendered all but obsolete. The emergence of advanced anti-ship missiles and, later, unmanned aerial systems in the ensuing years cemented its fate. But now the battleship is back – and with a vengeance.
The U.S. has embarked on a brand new battleship program as part of its ambitious Golden Fleet initiative. The Trump-class battleship, or BBG(X). But it’s not just a cutting-edge new flagship in the U.S. Navy that’s gunning for the title “King of the Sea.” The BBG(X) upends long-standing U.S. naval doctrine, a move that could change the face of modern naval warfare. Here’s what you need to know about the $17 billion BBG(X), and why the U.S. Navy has decided to place the battleship front and central once again.
For decades, U.S. military power has been built around distributed fleets centered on the aircraft carrier. The logic stems in part from the lessons learned from the demise of the battleship in World War Two. In an age where air power held the advantage over naval power, battleships represented too much power and command concentrated in one place. For all its might, it had become too vulnerable to newer technologies. For the U.S., the carrier group was the solution. The air power housed on the U.S.’s massive carriers, combined with the plethora of weaponry on the attendant destroyers, submarines, and other support ships in the group, greatly increased the offensive power available to the U.S. from a single deployment.
Carrier groups also enabled multi-layered, highly effective defense for the carrier that simply wasn’t possible on a single battleship. But perhaps the most significantly advantage of a carrier group is that it spreads the risk. Firepower and command are distributed between multiple ships, increasing the overall resilience of all of them. The doctrine worked in practice as well as it does in theory. For decades, the U.S.’s carrier groups enabled it to project unrivalled power across the globe. And as Iran can currently affirm, they still do.
But now, the BBG(X) signals a major shift in thinking. The intention with this ship is to concentrate air defense command, long-range strike, and deterrence power into a single large platform, not across a distributed carrier group. This raises the question: to paraphrase the old saying, if it ain’t broke, why fix it? Why shift from what has been a winning strategy for so long? Well, times have changed. Weapons systems have evolved. And the realities of modern maritime combat aren’t what they used to be just a few years ago. The U.S. fleet is exposed to a range of new weapons like drone swarms and hypersonic missiles, creating vulnerabilities that didn’t exist before.
The U.S. is also developing a range of advanced new offensive and defensive weapons systems of its own that need to be integrated into its fleet. The BBG(X) is an attempt to kill both of those birds with a single stone. To be fair, it’s more like throwing a mountain range at the two issues than a stone, but you get the idea. According to President Donald Trump,
“They’ll be the fastest, the biggest, and by far, 100 times more powerful than any battleship ever built.”
Former Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, who was recently relieved of his duties, was marginally more subtle.
“The future Trump-class battleship – the USS Defiant – will be the largest, deadliest and most versatile and best-looking warship anywhere on the world’s oceans,”
he stated. Trump was standing alongside him, to be fair. But perhaps the best explanation of operational concept behind the new ship comes directly from the Navy’s budget request for it. It states that
“the Battleship’s primary role is to deliver high-volume, long-range offensive fires and serve as a robust, survivable forward command and control platform. [… It] offers cost-effective options for strike and defense, and its capacity to embark a fleet command staff enhances survivability by putting commanders closer to the fight.”
That means it can also function as
“a flexible command-and-control platform for both manned and unmanned platforms.”
Sounds impressive, right? But what does that all look like in practice? Well, the project is still in the very early stages of design, let alone development. Construction of the first of three intended battleships is only slated to begin in 2028. So, most of the finer details are still being figured out. But what we do know is that the ship is going to be high-tech, massive – and very, very powerful. The Trump-class is projected to have a 30,000 ton hull, providing more than three times the internal volume of a 9,000-ton destroyer. It is expected to measure between 853 and 890 feet in length with a beam of roughly 105 to 115 feet. That’s longer than the aforementioned Yamato, a super-long ship by any measure.
The ship is designed to achieve speeds above 30 knots, although the type of engine that’ll power it has evidently not yet been settled. Phelan said in April that said that while discussions were ongoing about the possibility of the Trump class warships being nuclear-powered, that was
“unlikely”
to be the case. Instead, Navy budget documents say the current plan is for the BBG(X) to use a combined conventional propulsion system that includes diesel generators and gas turbines. Although it’s not seen as an aircraft carrier, the BBG(X) does host a flight deck and dual hangars capable of supporting V-22 Osprey aircraft and future vertical lift systems. It also hosts an advanced sensor suite built around the AN/SPY-6 radar, which provides high-quality integrated air and missile detection and tracking.
The ship is expected to hold between 650 and 800 crewmembers, one of the largest crew sizes of any ship in the U.S. armada. Only the U.S.’s Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship (with a crew of 825), the Blue Ridge-class command ship (with a crew of 842), the America-class amphibious assault ship (with a crew of 2,745), the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship (with a crew of 2,979), and the Ford- and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers (with crews of around 4,660 and 5,680 respectively) can host more.
But the large crew is not what all that extra size and displacement on the BBG(X) is for. It’s needed for the battleship’s array of advanced weaponry, and the enormous power-generation capacity needed to operate some of it. The Navy budget request states that the ship’s
“advanced systems will enable true long-range strike with hypersonic weapons housed in new, larger vertical launch systems. […] Furthermore, its advanced naval gunfire offers cost-effective options for strike and defense.”
In practice, the offensive configuration of the Trump-class combines hypersonic and conventional missile systems within a single hull to provide multi-layered strike capability. The ship is designed to carry 12 Conventional Prompt Strike, or CPS, hypersonic missiles, intended to deliver conventional warheads at intercontinental ranges within approximately one hour.
The first ship of the class to be built – the aforementioned USS Defiant, or BBG-1 – will also include 128 Mk41 vertical launch system cells. That’s 25 percent more than the current Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer’s set of 96. These launchers can deploy Tomahawk land-attack missiles and Standard Missile interceptors among other munitions. The added firepower from the extra launchers will enable simultaneous engagement across multiple mission areas, including strike and air defense. That high concentration of firepower reduces reliance on multiple ships to achieve similar effects, but with the trade-off of increasing the dependence on onboard magazine capacity. The hull also allows for potential integration of SLCM-N nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, which would expand the range of deterrence options available to the U.S. surface fleet about as far as is currently possible.
But the range of cutting-edge weaponry doesn’t end with the CPS and SLCM-N, both of which are still in the process of being rolled out. Again, quoting from that Navy budget proposal:
“Vastly increased power generation, managed by a sophisticated integrated power system with high-capacity energy storage, will support mission-critical directed energy weapons like high-output lasers and electromagnetic railguns, reducing reliance on costly single-use munitions.”
Indeed, a major reason for the size of the new battleship is to provide a platform for these straight-out-of-science-fiction weapons: the electromagnetic railgun, laser directed energy weapons, and possibly microwave directed energy weapons. The U.S. Navy recently revived its abandoned railgun program, and is actively developing and testing both types of directed energy weapons. The problem with all three is that they require enormous amounts of power. That’s tricky enough to implement on land, but presents design challenges at sea that, for once, can genuinely be labelled “rocket science.” It remains to be seen how exactly the Navy’s engineers figure out how to power these systems aboard the new battleship. But there certainly appears to be more than enough space on board for their inclusion.
The railgun is intended primarily as an offensive weapon, intended to deliver hypersonic projectiles over 100–200 nautical miles to strike land targets, enemy ships, and hardened installations with kinetic energy. But its high velocity and rapid time-to-target also make it suitable for missile defense, intercepting anti-ship cruise missiles, drones, and even hypersonic threats. By contrast, the directed energy weapons are primarily defensive in nature. Laser weapons are mainly used for counter-drone, or C-UAS, counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar, or C-RAM, short-range air defense, or SHORAD, and dazzling or damaging sensors on enemy platforms. Microwave weapons focus on non-kinetic electronic attack and are primarily used for disrupting or disabling drone swarms, enemy communications and radar, and missile guidance systems.
On the BBG(X), directed energy weapons in the 300 to 600 kilowatt range are planned as part of the baseline configuration, with potential upgrades toward approximately 1 megawatt, depending on how much power can be packed onto the ship. The laser systems, reportedly to be derived from the ODIN and HELIOS systems, are intended to support surveillance, targeting, and counter-drone operations. Their inclusion underscores how the ship’s defensive systems are structured to counter a range of threats through layered interception and active engagement, rather than via passive protection.
In addition to the directed energy weapons, the Trump-class battleship’s defensive setup includes two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers for close-in defense against incoming missiles and aircraft. It also sports two 5-inch/62 caliber guns for surface engagements along with four 30-millimeter systems for short-range defense against small craft and aerial threats. As you can see, the fact that anti-drone systems are included as a standard component of the defensive architecture reflects the increasing use of unmanned systems in maritime conflict. For any ship, and especially one where so much firepower is concentrated, this new reality means that survivability is increasingly dependent on the ability to detect and intercept threats before impact.
The BBG(X) will thus require continuous operation of sensors and weapons under high power demand, and reliable performance of integrated combat systems under sustained attack conditions. Getting that right, and keeping it right as emerging technologies need to be integrated or combatted over time, is no easy feat. The list of high-tech projects that have been delayed or even cancelled due to design issues tells you just how difficult a process it can be. That’s why Navy brass is emphasizing getting the design and advanced technology right before diving into the deep end with the BBG(X). As per the Navy budget request,
“An innovative strategy is guiding the new Battleship’s design and construction, centered on a state-of-the-art digital workflow. This utilizes modern digital engineering, AI-enabled design, and advanced production practices to reduce cost and schedule risk. Adopting best practices from Korean and Japanese shipbuilding, the approach emphasizes high design maturity before construction begins, precision modular construction, and tight integration between design and production teams. […] The strategy is designed to stabilize the workforce, increase industrial resilience, and deliver the new capability more predictably and affordably.”
Hopefully, this new approach will avoid the kinds of issues experienced with the Constellation-class frigate. The design of that ship was still being finalized as of April 2025, nearly five years after the initial contract award and with work already having begun on the lead ship. This unfortunate state of affairs occurred despite the Navy having explicitly chosen a derivative of an in-production frigate – the Franco-Italian Fregata Europea Multi-Missione, or FREMM – to help reduce risk and keep the program on track.
Now, just to be clear, the introduction of the BBG(X) signals a doctrinal shift where the concentration of power on a single battleship is now deemed an essential element of future warfare, as opposed to a glaring vulnerability. But it certainly doesn’t mean the U.S. will be throwing the baby out with the bathwater so to speak, by pivoting entirely from its established fleet and way of operating. That much is obvious from the Navy budget proposal itself. According to it, the battleship is intended to add
“capability at the highest end of the Golden Fleet high-low mix.”
Furthermore,
“the Battleship can lead a Surface Action Group, integrate with a Carrier Strike Group, or operate autonomously to secure critical sea lanes.”
So, it’s not meant to replace the U.S.’s carrier group or carrier to become the new ultimate global power projector. Rather, it’s the flagship of a new generation of high-end surface combatants intended to future-proof the U.S. Navy while dramatically expanding firepower at sea. In other words, as an advanced next-generation ship in the U.S. Navy, it has company, both at the high and low ends of that high-low Golden Fleet mix.
The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2027 includes $1 billion in advance funds to begin work on the BBG(X), plus another $837 million in research-and-development funds. The actual procurement slash keel laying would commence the following year, fueled by a budget request for a whopping $17 billion for the first ship. That would make it the most expensive ship ever commissioned. The current record holder is the USS Gerald R. Ford – the first of the new Ford-class carriers – which reportedly cost around $13.3 billion.
But besides the advance funding for the new battleship, the Navy’s $65.8 billion budget also includes requests to procure 17 other battle force ships plus 16 auxiliary, or support, ships. In particular, it wants to buy one Columbia-class submarine, two Virginia-class submarines, one FF(X) Frigate, one Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer, one America-class Amphibious Assault ship, one San Antonio-class Amphibious Transport Dock, six Medium Landing Ships, two John Lewis-class Oiler Tankers, two Submarine Tender Replacements, and one Ocean Surveillance Ship. In addition to these “new” purchases, the request also continues incremental funding for the third and fourth Ford-class carriers which are currently under construction.
So, it’s evident that the Navy isn’t putting all its eggs into one basket with the BBG(X). And that’s prudent. For all its incredible firepower, the basic vulnerability that made the battleships of the early 20th century obsolete still remains. The concentration of so much power on one vessel makes it a prime target for the U.S.’s adversaries. In some settings – for example the U.S.’s ongoing operation off the coast of Venezuela – a single Trump-class battleship could almost certainly do a more militarily effective and much more cost-effective job than a carrier group. The scope of the operation – ostensibly preventing drug running – and the threat from Venezuela don’t really warrant the extended deployment of a carrier or extended strike group that we’ve seen.
One BBG(X) with a small fleet of Ospreys could blow random speedboats out of the water at will just as effectively and for a tiny fraction of the cost. Right now, the U.S. doesn’t have too many other options than a strike group. The BBG(X) will eliminate that problem. However, in more hotly contested environments, for example in China’s backyard, the rationale behind spreading power and command across a carrier group still probably holds true. No-one really knows how the U.S. and China’s most advanced weaponry will stack up against each other, because they’ve yet to face off. Until much more is known about actual capabilities, concentrating too much power – and expense – on a single asset in Chinese-controlled waters is probably a risk the Navy is unlikely to take. Especially if the U.S. is now able to field carrier or other strike group formations that include a BBG(X). And that’s definitely part of the plan.
According to the budget request,
“As a flexible command-and-control platform for both manned and unmanned platforms, the Battleship can lead a Surface Action Group, integrate with a Carrier Strike Group, or operate autonomously to secure critical sea lanes.”
In fact, part of the rationale behind the BBG(X) is to plug a hole in its strike group formations created by the retirement of Ticonderoga-class cruisers. They had long provided dedicated air defense command functions within U.S. carrier strike groups but have become, shall we say, a little long in the tooth.
By the mid-2020s, the surface fleet structure had effectively narrowed to Arleigh Burke-class destroyers as the only major combatant in production. Originally the plan was to fill the gap left by the Ticonderoga’s retirement with the new DDG(X) destroyer program. But it ran into those pesky design issues. Design studies conducted between 2021 and January 2026 concluded that the DDG(X) hull form was insufficient to support the required number of vertical launch system cells, integration of CPS missiles, and future high-energy weapons without exceeding power and cooling margins. In other words, the design was dead in the water. U.S. Navy leadership evaluated a dual-variant destroyer approach but ultimately decided – wisely – that splitting mission sets across variants wouldn’t meet operational requirements. The decision was then made to move toward a single larger hull capable of accommodating all the DDG(X)’s planned systems – and then some. The result is the BBG(X).
It certainly looks impressive on paper, and the rationale behind its conception makes sense. But as the Navy acknowledges, it’s still early and significant challenges will need to be overcome to bring the eventual design to fruition, let alone within budget and on time. For one thing, huge question marks hang over the U.S.’s shipbuilding industry’s ability to deliver. Major shipyards such as Bath Iron Works, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Newport News Shipbuilding are currently operating with workforce shortages and existing production commitments. Expanding production capacity will thus require the recruitment and training of skilled labor, as well as substantial investment in infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities.
The scale of the BBG(X) program is also expected to drive demand for specialized components and advanced manufacturing processes, introducing risks related to schedule delays and cost increases. Add Trump’s trade wars and ongoing maritime entanglement in the Persian Gulf to the mix, and those risks only increase. How these challenges facing this ambitious and exciting project are met – or not met – will be answered in due course. We’ll of course be following developments intently and keep you updated. In the meantime, watch this video to discover whether the aircraft carrier is in fact already obsolete. Thanks for watching.