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Somali Pirates Made a Fatal Mistake — They Attacked a Ship Full of Navy SEALs

“5:00 a.m. local time, Gulf of Aiden. USS Ashland, an amphibious dock landing ship, was transiting approximately 330 nautical miles east of Djibouti and 130 nautical miles north of the closest point of the Somali coast in the Puntland region. Radar picture clear. A standard transit through one of the most heavily patrolled stretches of the world’s oceans.”

“On board, 397 crew members and roughly 500 Marines. At that moment, one of the lookouts on the port bridgewing was running a standard visual sweep of the horizon. Through binoculars, the lookout caught a small smudge approximately four nautical miles off the port bow. At first, it resembled a fishing boat, a category that has dozens of possible variants per square degree of the Gulf of Aiden.”

“A minute later, it was no longer ambiguous. The object was holding a direct intercept course on Ashland at roughly 25 knots. A skiff approximately 22 feet in length. A white fiberglass hull with a single Yamaha outboard motor on the transom. Seven men on board. The helmsman aft at the tiller. Five spread along the gunnels, one at the bow.”

“The lookout passed the report to the officer of the deck. The U did not call general quarters immediately. No apparent threat had yet materialized. The Gulf of Aiden is full of high-speed local craft, and a false alarm on an amphibious ship with a thousand people aboard is not a trivial event.”

“Instead, the order was to maintain observation and immediately notify the tactical action officer. Over the next 6 minutes, the skiff closed from 4 mi to 1.2 mi. At that range, the binoculars produced a picture that left no room for alternative readings: an AK-47 with its distinctive curved magazine in the hands of one of the men on board.”

“The cylindrical tube of an RPG7 rocket propelled grenade launcher on the shoulder of another. The rest had small arms of various types. The lookout spoke a single word over the intercom, and the ship shifted into a posture it had drilled for years. At 5:06 a.m., from the port side, a PG7 V-shaped charge grenade was launched toward Ashlin’s stern.”

“Launch range, approximately 280 m, beyond the reliable stabilization envelope of the rocket’s fin assembly. The grenade veered off course. It passed a stern at an altitude of roughly 4 m above the water line and impacted the sea approximately 60 m behind the ship where it detonated on its self-destruct fuse. This was an attempt to engage the warship.”

“But let’s step back to understand how seven armed men in a fiberglass skiff ended up in the middle of the Gulf of Aiden, 130 nautical miles from the nearest coastline, and made the decision to attack a United States warship. We need to roll back several hours and really several months. Seven men from Puntland put to sea from a fishing village on the northern coast. All Somali.”

“None of them had ever successfully hijacked a commercial vessel before. Most had never been further from their own coastline than a day’s run. They had a mother ship, a DAO, the traditional wooden vessel with a latine sail and a Perkins diesel engine. Roughly 60 ft long with the narrow stern wheelhouse typical of the Yemen style.”

“The DAO had been captured earlier from local fishermen. Aboard the DAO was a stock calculated for approximately 10 days of continuous time at sea. Separately fuel. Several 200 L drums of diesel for the mother ship’s engine, plus a separate reserve of gasoline in 20 L jerry cans for the skiff’s outboard.”

“The business plan was standard for that year: find a commercial cargo vessel, approach it in the skiff at speed, preferably from two directions, throw the grappling hook, climb the ladder, take the bridge, steer the ship to the Somali coast, and wait for the ransom. The standard payout that year was between $1.5 and $5 million for a midsized merchant vessel.”

“The first run ended quickly and not the way it had been planned. Their DAO was stopped by the British frigot HMS Chatham operating as part of the multinational combined maritime forces. The British conducted a boarding under article 110 of UNCLO. Found the weapons and the ladders but by the standard practice of that period known as catch and release did not make an arrest.”

“The legal framework at the time did not permit coalition forces to transfer suspected pirates to regional courts without formal reception agreements in place. The weapons were confiscated, the fuel partially drained, and the men were released back aboard their DAO with just enough fuel to reach shore.”

“It was a failed episode, but not a fatal one. A few months later, the group was back at sea with a new skiff, new weapons, a fresh fuel load. By the first week of April, they were positioned roughly in the middle of the Gulf of Aiden, holding station and waiting for a target. And here came the development their business plan had not accounted for.”

“The Perkins diesel on the mother ship failed. The damage was serious, most likely cylinder scoring from contaminated fuel, a standard problem for engines that ran on diesel from underground Somali fuel caches. Without its main engine, the DAO became a sailing vessel that in the absence of wind drifted with the current at 1 to 2 knots.”

“This changed everything. A DAO without an engine cannot pursue a target, cannot evade coalition patrols, cannot even hold its chosen waiting station. The only remaining asset was the skiff. The skiff held approximately 80 L of gasoline in its built-in tank, plus four 20 L jerry cans, roughly 160 L total.”

“At an economic cruise of 18 knots, that gave a one-way radius of approximately 100 nautical miles. At assault throttle less. The nearest Somali coastline was 130 nautical miles to the south, which meant that even if they abandoned the DAO immediately and ran for shore, the fuel would not get them there. One option remained: attack the first viable target that appeared on the horizon, take it, collect a ransom, or at minimum bring it back to the Somali coast.”

“At 4:30 a.m., a silhouette appeared on the horizon. A large vessel several hundred feet long moving east at approximately 14 knots. In the gray pre-dawn light, only the general outlines were visible. A long hull superstructure in the aft third, a low freeboard. The paint scheme was gray.”

“That should have been the first red flag. But the light, the fatigue after several days of drift, the pressure of the running out fuel clock, the absence of decent optics in the hands of the men making the call, all of it converged into a single fatal misread. It is also possible that Farah and his companion simply could not parse warship silhouettes.”

“A fisherman from Bosaso might see a military ship maybe once or twice in his entire life from a beach in a port. The silhouette of an amphibious dock landing ship with its minimal superstructure and long flat hull is genuinely less distinctive than the profile of a guided missile cruiser or destroyer with a tall sensor mast.”

“Whether this was a genuine identification error or a desperate gamble because no other options remained, that is a question that was never resolved. At 5:06 a.m., the PG7 grenade detonated in the water a stern of Ashlin. On the bridge, full combat readiness was already in effect. The 1MC public address system broadcast the general quarters alarm, the short rapid tone sequence that every US Navy sailor knows from the first day of service.”

“Within 22 seconds, the entire crew was at battle stations. From the moment the warship had been engaged, the commanding officer had full legal authority to use deadly force under the principle of unit self-defense. No consultation up the chain of command was required. On the starboard side of the ship, approximately 30 ft above the water line, was a stabilized MK38 Mod 2 gun mount.”

“At its core, the M242 Bushmaster automatic chain gun with a rate of fire of one round per trigger press in singleshot mode or 200 rounds per minute in short bursts. At that moment, the skiff was approximately 220 m off the starboard beam, running on a parallel course, preparing to launch a second grenade.”

“The MK38 operator placed the reticle on the skiff’s hull in the area of the engine. The laser rangefinder returned the range. The ballistic computer applied corrections for sea state, parallax, and the target’s relative motion. First round, a 25mm armor-piercing incendiary shell passed through the skiff’s fiberglass sidewall in the area where the fuel jerry cans were stowed.”

“The skiff caught fire along its entire length. One of the pirates fell into the water immediately after the first round. The remaining six made it over the side. The skiff continued to burn for roughly another minute until the flames reached the main fuel tank, triggering a secondary detonation and the hall finally broke apart.”

“Within minutes, only a charred fragment of the bow section remained, drifting nearby. Six men in the water. The sea temperature in April at that point in the Gulf of Aiden is around 27° C. Hypothermia is not a factor. Other risks are the Gulf of Aiden has a significant shark population, including white tip reef and tiger sharks. Two of the survivors had wounds, fragmentation injuries from skiff debris, and from their own weapons cooking off in the MK38 fire.”

“From Ashlin’s starboard side, two rigid hull inflatable boats lowered away. Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in body armor with M4A1 carbines. The approach to the men in the water followed the standard procedure. First, a verbal command from the RHIB coxin over the bullhorn: ‘Show hands. Do not approach the boat. Do not dive.'”

“Then, one by one, the men were pulled from the water. The recovery operation took roughly four minutes. Six survivors on the main deck. A medical team was waiting. Two of the wounded were transferred straight to sick bay where the ship surgeon performed initial debrement of fragment wounds. The other three were isolated in the lower hangar bay handcuffed to welded fittings under continuous armed guard.”

“Eventually the pirates were transported to the United States Norfol, Virginia, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Six Somali men, Muhammad Ali Sahed, Muhammad Abdi Jama, Abdikasi Kabasi, Abdi Razak Abshir Osman, Muhammad Farah, and Jamaidal Ibrahim stood before federal judge Raymond Jackson. The charge: piracy under 18 USC.”

“Section 1,651 plus seven additional counts, including assault on federal officers and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. It was the first piracy trial in a US federal court since the Civil War. The defense strategy was original. The attorneys built their case not on denying the fact of the engagement itself, but on challenging the legal classification.”

“First, they argued that their clients had been fing refugees from Somalia to Yemen and had drifted near Ashlin by accident when the skiff’s engine failed. The shots, they said, had been signal fire, an attempt to attract attention and get help. Second, and this was the principal argument, the defense maintained that their client’s conduct did not meet the definition of piracy under article 101 of unclo because the pirates had never boarded Ashlin and had never robbed her.”

“And piracy by classical definition requires an act of robbery or seizure. On August 17th, 2010, Judge Jackson granted the defense motion and dismissed the piracy charge. In his ruling, he cited the Supreme Court decision in United States versus Smith from 1820, which defined piracy specifically as robbery upon the sea.”

“If there had been no robbery, there had been no piracy. The remaining lesser charges stood. The decision sent a shock through the international legal community. If firing on a warship in international waters was not piracy, then the American position on universal jurisdiction over Somali pirates was facing a serious challenge.”

“On May 23rd, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously vacated Jackson’s ruling. Judge Robert King writing for the panel held that the modern definition of piracy under international law encompasses any armed attack on the high seas committed with piradical intent regardless of whether that attack succeeds.”

“The case was remanded to Norfolk. On February 27th, 2013, a jury convicted Muhammad Farah and four of his codefendants on all counts, including piracy. Sentencing turned out to be complicated because of the specifics of US federal law. The mandatory sentence for piracy in the United States has been life imprisonment since 1909.”

“Before that, the mandatory sentence was death, which meant that the judge had no discretion. Once the piracy conviction was on the record, the term was fixed and automatic. Jackson, who personally disagreed with mandatory life sentences for men who had neither killed nor robbed anyone, initially imposed terms ranging from 30 to 42 1/2 years.”

“The prosecution appealed. On August 13th, 2015, the fourth circuit reversed again, this time vacating the sentences themselves and ordered Jackson to impose the mandatory life terms. The final picture after all the trials and appeals: Muhammad Abdi Jama life plus 30 years. Abdikasi’s Kabasi life plus 30 years.”

“Abdi Abshir Osman life plus 10 years. Muhammad Farah life plus 10 years. Muhammad Ali say 33 years. Jamael Ibrahim who took a cooperation deal and testified in a separate case concerning the 2008 hijacking of the Norwegian vessel CEC Future received 15 years. All six with life sentences are currently serving them in maximum security federal prisons on US soil.”

“The probability of early release is zero. None of them will ever again see Somalia or the sea.”

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