The Strait of Hormuz remains the focal point of the crisis in the Middle East. The hard posturing between Iran and the United States continues in order to open this strait and return maritime traffic to normal. Washington’s aim is crystal clear. “Hormuz must never be closed, and the mines lined up in the strait by the Revolutionary Guards must be urgently removed.”
This narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman has been drowning in this problem for months because Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have turned the strait into a virtual risk zone by using Gashi-type fast attack crafts, each capable of carrying two to four mines. The entrance and exit points of Hormuz, its middle and narrow sections, the Omani side, and the northern routes close to the Iranian coast have been filled with Maham 3 and Maham 7 type mines.
In fact, even Iran does not know the location of some of the drifting sea mines. However, this situation has left the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil normally pass daily, open to US intervention. For this reason, Washington has initiated a process that could change the fate of the strait by signing one of the harshest moves in recent times.
According to US Central Command, 90% of the mine stock that Iran had kept ready to mine Hormuz and that it might release into the hot waters of the strait in the second phase of the crisis has been destroyed. Yes, you heard correctly. Admiral Brad Cooper, head of CENTCOM, confirmed that they have eliminated 90% of the 8,000 sea mines possessed by Iran.
If we make a rough calculation based on the data announced by Admiral Cooper, Tehran has lost 7,200 of its sea mines. This is truly a massive number for them. But the important point here is what the IRGC, which may have dragged Iran into war, has actually lost in Hormuz. That is the unseen side of the iceberg.
Because from the beginning of the crisis process, the Revolutionary Guards have relentlessly continued this attrition tactic by putting forward the Hormuz card. The IRGC, which does not want to give up the tough role it has undertaken, may now be losing its only remaining threat element. Iran’s mines are being destroyed before they can even enter the hot waters of Hormuz.
On the other hand, the United States is systematically targeting not only the mines in storage, but also the platforms that lay these mines at sea. In other words, Iran can no longer use not only the mines kept ready to be released into the strait, but also the ships that would lower them into the sea waters to a great extent because the data presented by Admiral Cooper before the Senate Armed Services Committee confirms this situation.
In the operations, a total of 161 ships belonging to the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian Navy have been sunk in the waters of the Gulf. Among these ships were the critical mine-laying platforms and logistical supply vessels that silently released those deadly mines into the waters. The dangerous advantage of the IRGC in Hormuz has now largely evaporated.
In the past, they could hold billion-dollar tankers, warships, and global energy flows hostage with a handful of cheap mines. With a few boats, they could close the strait, spike oil prices, panic insurance companies, and hold a strong position at the diplomatic table. Now, however, the overwhelming majority of its stock, a significant part of its production infrastructure, and a large portion of its mine-carrying boats have been destroyed.
The limited number of remaining sea mines are either drifting randomly or waiting in an uncoordinated manner. This double blow, namely the destruction of mine stocks and the platforms that put them into the sea, will seriously weaken Tehran on the Hormuz issue because initiating a new large-scale mining operation has now become much riskier and more costly for the IRGC, both logistically and militarily.
In other words, Iran’s mosquito fleet is gradually losing its influence day by day. On the US side, mine-clearing operations are progressing quite effectively. As you may recall, even Arleigh Burke-class destroyers like USS Frank E. Petersen and USS Michael Murphy had passed through the strait despite Iran’s threats and the mines it had laid at sea.
Currently, it is reported that littoral combat ships, Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships, MH-60 helicopters, and especially advanced underwater drones like the MK-18 are on alert in Hormuz. The United States wants to turn the southern routes of the strait, that is the Omani side, and important sections of the main traffic separation schemes into safer areas.
According to Pentagon estimates, full clearance of Hormuz from mines could take up to 6 months, but the work to create safe corridors is progressing much faster. Currently, a limited number of commercial ships can make controlled passages, and this number is increasing every week. Moreover, this process also gives Washington the opportunity to effectively control a larger part of Hormuz.
Because as mine-clearing operations advance, the US Navy can establish a permanent or semi-permanent presence at critical points in the strait. This would allow Iran’s future provocations to be suppressed much faster and more effectively. This means that the regions that the IRGC once declared red lines are becoming more accessible to US warships and drones.
From Tehran’s perspective, this is a complete strategic defeat. The asymmetric dominance doctrine that the Revolutionary Guards had established over the strait has collapsed. It no longer has its stocks or platforms at their former strength. These losses are described not only as military, but also as a psychological blow.
For years, the Iranian regime had boasted to its own people and the region that “Hormuz is in our hands.” But now they are forced to turn to diplomacy and make limited concessions to open the strait. In the coming months, the goals of the United States, which wants to completely eliminate Iran’s influence in Hormuz, seem quite clear.
To systematically clear the remaining mines, expand safe passage corridors, and if necessary, suppress Iran’s remaining small boat activities with a free fire policy. Once these goals are achieved, the return of Hormuz to full capacity for global energy flows will be only a matter of time. Iran, having largely lost its cards in Hormuz, is being pushed into a more passive and defensive position.
Although the focal point of the crisis is still Hormuz, the ropes now appear much stronger in Washington’s hands. This change is powerful enough to reshape not only the fate of a strait, but also all Middle East energy balances and global oil markets. At this point, however, Iran, which does not fully accept defeat and still wants to show that it is on the field with ruthless strategies, does not hesitate to put forward very different cards, drones, and missiles.
As you know, Iran has historically followed completely asymmetric strategies in such war and conflict situations. It is clear that the IRGC has not abandoned this attitude in today’s crisis process either. Because in order to continue the war and make the United States accept the agreement items it wants, it still does not hesitate to bring its drone and missile stocks to the forefront.
In fact, Iran is sowing terror in the Gulf region with these military resources as well. So, what is in Tehran’s underground missile and drone stock? The Revolutionary Guards still have thousands of one-way attack drones like the Shahed-136 and its derivatives along with various range ballistic missiles. Their monthly production capacity could reach up to 10,000 drones before the war and part of this capacity is still active.
The IRGC has positioned these weapons as a new cheap and swarming attack wave that will replace the mine threat in Hormuz. Drone swarms, due to their low cost, aim to deplete the US’s expensive air defense missiles such as Patriot and the AAD munitions, to harass ships, and to keep Gulf oil infrastructure under constant pressure. Indeed, in March and April 2026, Iran carried out hundreds of drone and missile attacks on US bases, oil facilities, and civilian infrastructure in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. In some attacks, tankers were hit, fires broke out in refinery facilities, and civilian casualties occurred in Gulf countries. These attacks, combined with the mine threat in Hormuz, virtually held global energy markets hostage. Insurance premiums skyrocketed and many shipping companies changed their routes. However, the Gulf did not remain unresponsive.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates did not stay silent in the face of Iran’s direct attacks. Both countries carried out secret counterattacks on Iranian territory. Saudi Arabia conducted air strikes on missile and logistics facilities inside Iran while the UAE carried out air strikes on an important oil refinery on Lavan Island.
Although these operations were not clearly disclosed to the public, they deeply shook the regional power balance. Gulf monarchies, which had been pursuing a strategic patience policy against the threat from Iran for years, now appear bold enough to carry out direct retaliation. This situation has largely nullified Iran’s strategy of intimidating the Gulf.
The Trump administration, in the meantime, has been operating in very close coordination with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. President Donald Trump took the security concerns of the Gulf allies seriously and continued the maximum pressure policy against Iran. He increased intelligence sharing with the UAE and Saudi Arabia both in diplomatic channels and on the military front, supported joint patrols, and gave the green light for potentially harsher steps if necessary.
Trump’s approach was clear. “Hormuz will remain open and Iran’s missile and drone threat will be contained.” This policy encouraged the Gulf countries to be more proactive against Iran. According to international analysis reports, the UAE and Saudi Arabia demanded a more decisive stance from Trump against Iran and advocated the view that Iran must be sufficiently weakened before the war ends.
However, despite all this pressure circle, Iran still does not hesitate to use its drone and missile stock. Although IRGC commanders have not abandoned the propaganda slogan, “Hormuz is in our hands,” they now see their real cards in drone swarms and ballistic missiles; they are also trying to open additional fronts in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by activating their remaining stocks through proxy groups.
This is Iran’s classic strategy. Instead of direct conventional war, increasing the opponent’s costs with cheap, numerous, and hard-to-detect weapons. However, the limits of this tactic are becoming increasingly evident. Thanks to US air superiority, the advanced air defense systems of the Gulf countries, and Israel’s intelligence support, the success rate of Iran’s drone and missile attacks is decreasing. Many missiles and drones are destroyed in the air and the remainder cause limited damage. While the Iranian economy is already shaken by heavy sanctions and war damage, continuously using these weapons is also rapidly depleting stocks.
Since part of the production facilities has been hit, the renewal speed has slowed. In other words, while Iran has largely lost its mine card in Hormuz, it is also slowly consuming the drone and missile threat. This erosion on both fronts is forcing Tehran more toward diplomacy. The United States and its Gulf allies are forcing Iran to the table by increasing both military and economic pressure.
Tehran’s cards in hand are rapidly decreasing. Washington’s determined stance, the Gulf’s active role, and the IRGC’s eroding capacity show that a new power balance is forming in the Middle East. However, things are not that simple for the Iranian regime. The rapid erosion of the mine and drone missile cards in Hormuz has brought Tehran to a strategic crossroads.
Iran may now have three basic paths before it: “Full surrender, controlled retreat, or the most feared possibility, one last risky escalation.” The regime seems to have chosen the second path so far, but the cost of this preference is increasing every day. On the other hand, Iran’s strongest remaining tool is the indirect war it conducts through its proxy networks.
These asymmetric groups are still defined as cheap, time-buying mechanisms held by the regime. However, these proxies are no longer as effective as before. The Houthi Red Sea operations have been largely suppressed by the hard interventions of the international coalition. The militias in Iraq are increasingly isolated due to local public reaction.
Therefore, the proxy card is also slowly running out. Another option could be nuclear pressure. Iran occasionally reminds the public that it has accelerated its nuclear program and raised its uranium enrichment level above 60%. This is the strategic ambiguity policy that the regime sees as its last resort.
However, this card can also be a double-edged sword because nuclear advancement carries the risk of triggering a harsher military intervention by Israel and possible direct operations by the United States. The regime wants to gain an advantage at the bargaining table by implying that it has reached the nuclear weapons threshold.
But this move also deepens its international isolation. The economic front is the most painful point for Tehran. The prolongation of the war combined with the dramatic decline in oil exports, heavy sanctions, and the collapse of the domestic economy has put the regime in a serious legitimacy crisis. The Iranian rial is at record lows.
Inflation is officially above 40% and the people’s purchasing power is eroding. Shortages of basic food items and fuel have emerged in some cities. Under these conditions, although the regime utters victory cries, domestic unrest is growing every day. The risk of an explosion similar to the protest wave in December and January has become the biggest nightmare for Iranian decision-makers.
So after all this, will Iran surrender? According to military analysts, the current outlook points more toward a controlled withdrawal rather than full surrender. While the regime is forced to accept the mine and drone losses in Hormuz, it is demanding diplomatic support and limited economic aid from China and Russia. It appears that Beijing is ready to play a mediating role due to its energy needs, while Moscow is acting more cautiously because of its own Ukraine agenda.
This dual support buys time for Tehran but is not a strategic savior. On the other hand, the Trump administration’s approach of agreement or harsher interventions is cornering Iran. Washington expects concrete steps from Iran for a possible ceasefire: “Sharing the coordinates of the remaining mines in Hormuz, stopping drone attacks, and stepping back in the nuclear program.”
In return, offers such as the gradual easing of sanctions and allowing the normalization of oil exports are on the table. Meanwhile, regional dynamics are also changing. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE have given signals of normalization, they are acting more assertively as they see Iran weakening. This multi-layered pressure is straining the Iranian regime both domestically and externally.
In conclusion, the fate of the Strait of Hormuz crisis is no longer just about military power. Diplomacy, economy, domestic stability, and regional alliances are working together. Although the Iranian regime has not abandoned the “axis of resistance” rhetoric, it sees that its cards are rapidly eroding. Tehran will either sit at the table in a controlled manner and minimize its losses or it will make everything worse with one last risky move.
At the moment, the advantage seems to be in favor of Washington and the Gulf capitals. The full opening of Hormuz and the return of maritime traffic to normal is not only a matter of time, but can also be the harbinger of a new Middle East balance. How quickly the regime will accept this reality remains the most critical question of the coming weeks.
“What do you think about this after largely losing its military cards in Hormuz? Will the Iranian regime accelerate its nuclear program and make one last strategic bluff? Or will they see that this move will completely finish the regime and take a controlled step back?”
