A quiet but profound escalation is taking place in Belarus. On May 12th, Alexander Lukashenko sat down with Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin and he announced to the world that Belarus was preparing for war.
“We will selectively mobilize our troops. We will prepare the armed forces for combat. God willing, this can be avoided.”
These words had a rhetorical reality on the ground. A new special operations brigade was being formed in the home region and S-400s and Su-30SM2s continued to arrive from Russia. Road, trench, and logistics infrastructure work was accelerating near the Ukrainian border.
Belarus’s military activity is striking, but the decision lies not in Lukashenko’s hands, but in Putin’s, and Putin adopted a very different stance at the Victory Day podium in the Kremlin. In front of journalists, Putin had said,
“I believe the conflict in Ukraine is nearing its end.”
On one hand, a signal of peace, on the other, preparations for war. This is the application of the Maskirovka concept in Russian military doctrine. However, this time it is unclear who is in the crosshairs of Putin and Lukashenko. Ukraine is, of course, the first name that comes to mind. But if you expand the map a bit, the entire line stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, from the Suwalki corridor to Crimea, could be on Putin’s radar.
However, things aren’t going as planned here. This time, they’re not facing just Ukraine. They’re facing the entire eastern flank. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, backed by Ukraine’s drone shield. Just to the north, Finland and Sweden remain on high alert to protect the Baltic Sea and Gotland Island from the Russian-Belarusian duo. On the Black Sea axis, where Putin places his greatest trust, Romania and Turkey stand shoulder-to-shoulder against potential threats from either country. In other words, while the Russian leader signals the potential for a new war in Europe by diverting attention with Lukashenko, he has actually brought the region into a full-fledged military readiness phase.
Now the cards are being played much more openly and the first move comes from Lithuania. On May 13th at the Bucharest 9 summit held in Bucharest, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda signed a comprehensive drone deal agreement. This agreement envisions the first ever factory-level joint production of Ukraine’s battle-tested drone technology in a NATO country. Four different classes of drones—long-range strike drones, maritime drones, interceptor drones, and bomber drones—will be jointly produced on Lithuanian soil. Technology transfer will take place with Ukrainian engineers and military experts taking direct roles at the production facilities in Lithuania. Additionally, a broad cooperation package regarding air and missile defense systems has been included in the agreement.
This step taken by Lithuania has created a domino effect. At the same summit, Latvia received a parallel proposal focused on air defense, and Ukrainian experts have already headed to Riga. Here’s the interesting part. Latvia had sent 12,000 drones to Ukraine in 2025. Now, the roles are reversing, and Ukraine’s expertise in electronic warfare and counter-drone operations is being transferred to Latvia’s own defense. Estonia requested an air security expert immediately following drone diversion incidents. Discussions with Finland regarding long-range drones and airspace security have also accelerated.
This drone deal poses a serious strategic challenge for Russia and Belarus because the inexpensive and effective drones developed by Ukraine on the front lines will now be mass-produced on the territory of the Baltic states. As a result, Lithuania and other Baltic countries will be able to respond to potential Russian hybrid attacks and drone threats both more quickly and at a lower cost.
But the Baltic countries aren’t just acquiring drones. They’re making their borders physically impassable. Estonia is constructing 600 pop-up concrete shelters along its 300 km border with Russia. Dragon’s teeth are being laid along the borders of Lithuania and Latvia. Behind these lie anti-tank trenches, minefields, and layered trench systems. For example, Lithuania’s defense line is three-layered. The first obstacles are located 5 km inland from the border, followed by blow-up bridges and tree-felling barriers with reserve trenches and positions at the very rear. The European press has dubbed this line the Maginot Line of the 21st century. But this time the goal is not an offensive. It is to buy enough time to halt a potential Russian ground operation within hours. At the same time, the three Baltic countries have raised their defense budgets to record levels, reinstated mandatory military service, and are planning joint arms purchases worth billions of euros from the EU.
This line, fortified on land in the Baltics, is also being strengthened in the air. Poland has taken the lead here. One of the biggest lessons from the war in Ukraine was that cheap kamikaze drones could bypass expensive air defense systems, and Europe has embarked on a massive project to close this gap. Officially known as the European Drone Defense Initiative, it aims to create a continuous drone shield along the eastern border stretching from Finland to Romania. This is not a physical wall. It consists of a multi-layered electronic shield comprising radar networks, sensor arrays, AI-powered early warning systems, signal jammers, and anti-drone weapons. The goal is simple: to detect and neutralize any drone coming from Russia or Belarus before it crosses the border.
In January 2026, a $4.3 billion contract for the SON anti-drone system was signed with a consortium comprising the Norwegian firm Kongsberg and the Polish firm PGZ. This system to be deployed along Poland’s eastern border will begin its first deliveries by the end of 2026. The Polish Ministry of Defense describes the project as autonomous swarms patrolling the air and anti-drone radars operating on the logic of the Great Wall of China. And this system was designed to work in conjunction with NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry.
Meanwhile, the European Sky Shield Initiative led by Germany brings together approximately 24 countries under a common shield using Patriot, IRIS-T, and Arrow 3 systems to counter threats far greater than drones. On the ground, Dragon’s Teeth will stop tanks. In the air, the UAV wall will block drones, and in the sky, the missile shield will counter ballistic threats. In other words, a three-layered defense architecture is in place.
The most vulnerable point of this defense line is the Suwalki corridor and the transformation taking place there is perhaps the most striking. On one side lies Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave bristling with Iskander missiles and S-400 systems. On the other, Belarus war game simulations have calculated that Russia could seize the corridor in 3 days. If the corridor closes, the Baltic states would be isolated by land.
Poland is making the largest investment to make this scenario impossible because the southern flank of the corridor lies directly within Polish territory. And what Poland is doing is not just defending a corridor, but building Europe’s new military powerhouse. By raising defense spending to 5% of GDP, Poland is the clear leader within NATO. It has ordered over 980 K2 Black Panther tanks from South Korea and 366 Abrams tanks are on the way from the US. By 2030, it will possess over 1,100 modern tanks, a figure exceeding the combined total of the UK, France, Germany, and Italy.
While ground forces are growing this strong, a fundamental transformation is also taking place in the air. By the end of May, the first F-35A Husarz fighter jets will arrive at Łask Air Base, which covers the Belarus-Kaliningrad corridor. The F-35 is not just a fighter jet, but a dual-use platform with nuclear capabilities and a direct response to Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. In April, Prime Minister Tusk announced the Polish drone fleet project, which will be developed based on the experience in Ukraine. In addition to all this, joint training areas are being established with Lithuania in Suwalki.
While Poland holds the southern flank, Germany has taken a historic step on the northern flank. For the first time since World War II, it has deployed a permanent heavy armored brigade outside its own borders: Panzerbrigade 45 Litauen. This unit with a capacity of approximately 5,000 soldiers and equipped with Leopard 2A8 tanks and Puma armored vehicles is being deployed directly on the outskirts of Suwalki. NATO’s multinational brigade in Lithuania led by Canada has also been brought up to full strength with 2,200 soldiers. The threat is so great that even Germany, which hasn’t deployed its troops beyond its borders in 80 years, has been forced to mass its tanks along the Russian border.
As these defensive lines rise in the north and west, Romania and Turkey are emerging as critical components of the defense architecture in the south. Romania has become one of the NATO countries most directly affected by Russia’s drone attacks. Since the beginning of 2026, 14 Russian drones have violated Romanian airspace. This threat has spurred Bucharest into swift action. In March, a joint defense production agreement was signed with Zelenskyy. And in April, access to a US counter-drone marketplace was secured. And at the Bucharest summit, Romania was offered a full drone deal.
Defense Minister Maruta, however, took this process to the next level at the EU Security Council on May 12th.
“We must regroup our eastern flank capabilities against Russian drones,”
he said. And Romania’s security concerns are not limited to its own airspace. In neighboring Moldova, approximately 1,500 Russian troops remain stationed in the Transnistria region. When Moldova declared the commanders of these troops Persona Non Grata in April, Russia immediately issued a warning that it had a right to intervene by providing energy and defense support to this vulnerable neighbor. Romania is assuming a dual shield role in southeastern Europe.
While Romania assumes this role on land, the primary strategic focus in the south lies with Turkey, which borders the Black Sea. Turkey has maintained a unique balance since the war began. With one hand, it has militarily strengthened Ukraine. With the other, it has preserved its role as a mediator. The most visible manifestation of this active neutrality policy was the Bayraktar TB2 drones. In 2022, they became an iconic weapon of the war by destroying targets including Russian tanks and the Moskva cruiser. Baykar announced that it has allocated its entire production capacity to Ukraine by 2025. And the factory near Kyiv has become fully operational with over 120 staff members.
The new generation TB3 model, meanwhile, made its debut in 2026 during NATO’s largest exercise deployed from the TCG Anadolu, a concrete demonstration of Turkey’s growing influence within NATO’s defense industry. But Turkey’s contribution is not limited to drones. A much broader security umbrella is at play. Kirpi armored vehicles, laser-guided missiles, electronic warfare systems, and Ada-class corvettes have been delivered to Ukraine. In the Black Sea, it is restricting the passage of warships by enforcing the Montreux Convention. It is effectively preventing reinforcements from reaching Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Together with Romania and Bulgaria, it is leading a joint mine-cleating task force under Turkish command. When these roles come together, Turkey establishes itself as a key actor in the Black Sea’s security architecture.
Zelenskyy clearly articulated the weight of this partnership during his surprise visit to Istanbul on April 4th.
“If Ukraine, the UK, and Turkey unite, a powerful army will emerge against Russia.”
Erdogan, meanwhile, laid out Turkey’s position with his characteristic clarity. While reiterating the demand for an updated customs union and visa-free travel, he stated,
“Europe needs Turkey more than we need Europe.”
This statement may sound like political rhetoric, but there is a concrete reality behind it. From Black Sea security to drone technology and from energy corridors to migration management, a significant portion of the critical issues on Europe’s agenda pass through Ankara. And Turkey’s defense industry possesses the capacity to back up these claims. The picture on display at Saha Expo 2026 was striking: plans for a drone production hub capable of manufacturing millions of units, the Mizrak munition with a range exceeding 1,000 km, kamikaze naval drones, and Kaan fighter jet prototypes. Turkey is emerging as one of the leading nations in the drone and electronic warfare sectors, not only in the Black Sea, but across the entire NATO alliance.
While Turkey maintains control over the Black Sea in the south, the balance of power in the north has shifted fundamentally, and it is Putin himself who has brought about this change. In 2023, Finland abandoned its 80-year-old neutrality and joined NATO. As a result, Russia’s land border with NATO extended by 1,340 km. A year later, Sweden joined as well, and the Baltic Sea turned into a NATO lake overnight. Now all coastal states are allies with the exception of Russia’s Kaliningrad. Russia’s Baltic fleet is surrounded by Finland to the north, Sweden to the west, and Poland to the south, making it increasingly difficult to reach open waters, receive reinforcements, and move freely. Sweden’s Gotland Island, situated right in the middle of the Baltic Sea and just 300 km from Kaliningrad, has taken on the role of an unsinkable aircraft carrier.
Russia is responding to this naval blockade with a shadow fleet. Old uninsured flag-changing tankers are cutting internet and energy cables on the seabed of the Baltic Sea. Between 2024 and 2026, the Estlink 2, Balticconnector, and Finland-Estonia cables were targeted. GPS jamming operations centered in Kaliningrad are threatening civilian aviation and maritime traffic. Ships are forced to revert to traditional paper charts and magnetic compasses. But every time these hybrid tactics are deployed, NATO’s response grows harsher. Surveillance of Russia has been stepped up. Finland sent a strong message by detaining suspicious vessels and investments in undersea cable protection have accelerated.
But a shadow hangs over all these conventional preparations. And this shadow falls once again from Belarus. Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been stationed on Belarusian territory since 2023 and nuclear-capable Oreschnik missiles were added in December 2025. Putin has been waving this card for 4 years but hasn’t played it because the cost of playing it is far heavier than the cost of not playing it. Poland’s F-35s are being deployed to Łask precisely as a nuclear-capable platform against this threat and the Sky Shield shield was designed to counter ballistic threats.
Looking at the bigger picture, Putin’s Belarus card is a multi-layered strategy: creating tension in the north to divide Ukraine’s resources, using Belarus as a drone base and potential launchpad, and blending diplomatic soft messaging with military pressure. But this strategy is backfiring. While Putin sought to weaken NATO, he has triggered Europe’s largest arms buildup. Poland is building one of the world’s largest tank fleets, and Germany is deploying a permanent battalion abroad for the first time in 80 years. The Baltic states are fortifying their borders with dragon’s teeth. Turkey has become a key security partner in the Black Sea, and with Finland and Sweden’s accession, the Baltic Sea has turned into a dead end for Russia.
Lukashenko’s dilemma, however, boils down to being caught between two fires. Mass protests had shaken the country following the rigged elections in 2020, and that fragility persists. If he enters a full-scale war, his regime could collapse. If he doesn’t, he risks being abandoned by Putin.
And Ukraine is responding to this threat, not with panic, but with preparedness. The 1,084 km northern border stretching from Volyn to Chernihiv has been transformed into a multi-layered defensive wall: minefields, a drone network, and pre-calibrated artillery coordinates. It defends using technology without massive troop buildup, securing the north without weakening counteroffensives in the south.
Moreover, there is a reality Lukashenko has not factored in. Attacking Ukraine is not just about confronting Ukraine. It also means facing Poland and Lithuania which lie to the west and northwest of Belarus, both of which are NATO members. And neither Lukashenko nor Putin is bold enough to take that risk.
