Ohio Submarine: Something Gigantic Has Entered the Mediterranean and the Revolutionary Guard is Now in a State of Total Panic
The diplomatic dialogue between the United States and Iran has completely collapsed. Believing they had found an opportunity, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attempted to threaten US naval forces in the region. They activated their air defense systems. They deployed their mini-submarines in a position ready to fire on the United States Navy. They withdrew their commanders to underground bunkers, but Washington responded not with words, but with a gigantic nuclear submarine stationed at the mouth of the Mediterranean.
On May 11, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alaska surfaced in front of civilian cameras and made a port visit to Gibraltar. And this surprise move by the United States takes the war in the Ormus equation to a completely different dimension, because the timing is not a coincidence. On the day the submarine arrived in Gibraltar, President Trump had described Iran’s proposed negotiations as totally unacceptable.
At the moment diplomatic channels were blocked, a nuclear-capable platform appeared at the mouth of the Mediterranean. No threatening statement was made, no press conference was held, it was simply parked there for all to see. In strategic deterrence, this is called the doctrine of silent intimidation. You don’t tell the other side what will be done. You only show what can be done, you leave the rest to their imagination, and this tactic hits the most vulnerable point of the Revolutionary Guard: uncertainty.
To understand the seriousness of the matter, it is of great importance to analyze the firepower that this submarine carries. The submarine has the capacity to carry up to 20 Trident nuclear missiles, which form the naval pillar of the United States’ nuclear triad. Visits to public ports of strategic assets of this caliber, at a time when diplomacy is blocked, are extremely rare.
The fact that a nuclear-capable platform is positioned relatively close to active conflict zones indicates that a new step has been taken on the escalation ladder. Apparently, the Washington administration plans to disrupt the calculations on the ground, casting the shadow of an unfired nuclear warhead in the mind of its adversary. Of course, the submarine is not a message in itself; it is simply the heaviest instrument in a much larger military orchestra.
The gigantic shadow beneath the waters was the direct result of a major collapse that resonated at the negotiating table. Currently, 41% of all active-duty U.S. Navy ships worldwide are positioned in and around the Strait of Hormuz. According to Stars and Stripes’ analysis, there are more than 27 US warships in the region, two carrier strike groups, more than 10 destroyers, two Marine Corps amphibious assault ships, three littoral combat ships and hundreds of fighter jets, plus more than 16,000 sailors and marines. The largest concentration of US naval power seen in a single region since World War II.
The USS Abraham Lincoln is conducting the epic Operation Fury in the Arabian Sea with F-35C carriers on its deck. The George H.W. Bush is operating with 25 F/A-18 Super Hornets, marking the first time since the start of the conflict that there are two aircraft carriers simultaneously in the same waters. According to CENTCOM’s own statement, the forces have so far forced 61 commercial vessels to turn back and disabled four.
And now, to this enormous force is added a submarine with nuclear weapons at the mouth of the Mediterranean. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle has passed through Suez and is advancing towards the Gulf through the Red Sea. The United Kingdom is sending a destroyer. On Tuesday, multinational defense ministers will discuss plans to reopen Ormus. The strategic bridges are being built one by one, and each one tightens the noose around Iran a little more.
Of course, the IRGC is watching all of this, and its reaction may say it all. What is particularly surprising is the following: none of these forces have opened fire yet. No new operation has been launched. However, all of these platforms were deployed in the same region during the same week. In military terminology, this is called a concentration of forces and is usually the harbinger of a major operation or a psychological blocking tool intended to break the will of the opposing side. The Revolutionary Guard knows both possibilities, and that is precisely why they are panicking.
At this point we must look at the other side of the stage, because Tehran’s reaction to this pressure reveals the anatomy of despair. In response to this asymmetric nuclear message sent by the United States across the Mediterranean, Iran decided to activate its own strategic playing field, the Strait of Hormuz.
The commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, announced that domestically produced mini-submarines, called “Dolphins of the Persian Gulf,” have been deployed on high alert in the Strait of Hormuz. He stated that these platforms are ready to fire, that they can remain motionless on the seabed for long periods to monitor enemy ships, and that they can enter combat if necessary.
On paper, this statement may seem like a formidable threat. It is believed that Iran may possess thousands of these types of submarines and that this could inflict serious damage on the United States Navy. However, from a realistic military perspective, comparing the Ghadir fleet to an Ohio-class submarine or the enormous destroyers of the US Navy is no different than comparing a rowboat to an ocean-going vessel.
However, while the eyes of the world are fixed on the waters of the Mediterranean and the Strait of Hormuz, this huge naval confrontation is just the tip of the iceberg. Naval power is only half the story. The truly alarming developments are taking place in the air. B-2 Spirit stealth bombers are being refueled at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Each one can transport two 14-ton GBU-57s in its internal compartments. This is the world’s largest conventional bomb, a monster capable of penetrating 60 meters deep.
These bombs were designed to attack Iran’s deep underground nuclear facilities and missile cities, and stockpiles have fallen to critical levels. The United States Air Force awarded Boeing a $62.55 million emergency refueling contract. New bombs are being produced. B-1B Lancers are being recharged with GBU-72 in the region. As we discussed earlier, these are the next-generation 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs that have never been used in any combat. These bombs have collapsed Iran’s coastal tunnels, and more are on the way.
The B-52 Stratofortress aircraft continue to erode Iran’s logistical infrastructure with cruise missiles and conventional munitions. An analysis by the Hudson Institute underscores a critical change in the operation. The United States has now moved from expensive Tomahawk cruise missiles to cheaper JDAMs, GPS-guided precision bombs.
What does this mean? Iran’s air defenses have collapsed to such an extent that US aircraft no longer need to launch expensive missiles from a safe distance. Now they can get close enough and drop cheap bombs. At the beginning of the war, the cost of a single Tomahawk was millions of dollars. Now, a JDAM that costs only a few thousand dollars does the same job. This significantly increases the depth of US ammunition, meaning it can sustain the war for much longer.
The F-15E Strike Eagles, transferred from RAF Lakenheath in the UK to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, are being rearmed. At Ovda Air Base in Israel, 12 F-22 Raptors—the first attack weapon deployed in Israel in US history—continue to provide an umbrella of air superiority. The 14 tanker aircraft at Ben Gurion provide the necessary range for US fighter jets to reach Iran. And in Al Udeid, Qatar, the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft have been deployed from the RAF, a rare Allied contribution.
The logic of the second phase is very clear. The goal is no longer to attack existing weapons, but to destroy the capacity to reproduce them. Missile factories, drone production facilities, component supply chains, the C-GRI logistics network—everything is in the crosshairs. Israel has attacked more than 100 of the regime’s production facilities in the last 24 hours. Weapons transport planes belonging to the IRGC’s Quds Force at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran were destroyed. Satellite images show 17 damaged aircraft. 10 of Iran’s 18 air bases have been attacked. Craters have opened up on the runways and reinforced shelters have collapsed.
Despite all this destruction, Iran has not surrendered and continues to fight, and the asymmetric capabilities at its disposal are truly challenging the United States. The biggest problem is the subsoil. Iran’s “Missile Cities” are enormous tunnel systems dug hundreds of meters deep into the mountains. The mobile missile launchers move along rail systems, emerge from the tunnel entrance to launch, and then return to the shelter.
Some of these installations, with depths of 200 to 300 meters under granite, are beyond the 60-meter penetration capacity of the GBU-57. And Iran may have deepened these tunnels even further following the hammer attack carried out at midnight. According to Bloomberg, despite a week of intense bombing, there has been no significant decrease in the number of Iran’s active ballistic missile launchers.
And Iran continues to attack Gulf countries. On March 16, Saudi Arabia announced that it had shot down 60 Iranian drones. A fuel depot near Dubai was attacked. Qatar intercepted two waves of missile attacks, a naval drone attack against an oil tanker 800 km from the strait in Kuwait. The geographical boundaries of the conflict are expanding. Claims are circulating that three Typhoon Kuwaiti fighter jets were destroyed at Ali Al Salem Air Base.
The United States is not directing this war from a safe distance. Their own troops are also at risk. Iran has also begun targeting KC-135 tanker aircraft. According to QAS analysis, five tanker aircraft were damaged at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia—a blow that directly affects the United States’ in-flight refueling capabilities. Without tanker aircraft, the range of the aircraft decreases, the number of raids is reduced, and the pace of operations slows down. This is exactly what Iran is seeking: to strike at the logistical backbone of the United States.
Finding mobile launchers hidden in 1.6 million square kilometers is like looking for a needle in a haystack. Some claim that the volume of missile launches has been reduced by 90%. However, Iran continues to rain missiles down on the entire Gulf. This contradiction is important. When Iran’s ammunition runs out, the launchers may fall silent, but if they can replenish it, they will continue. The objective of the second phase is precisely to eliminate this production capacity.
Despite this enormous power, the United States faces serious challenges. Ignoring them is not analysis, it’s propaganda. Isolation: Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and France refused to join the Ormus coalition. Spain closed the Rota and Morón bases. NATO declared that this is not our war. The United States is conducting this operation largely on its own with limited support from Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Gulf states had restricted US access to their own airspace and bases before the war for fear of retaliation from Iran.
Then there is the vacuum in the Pacific. Having 41% of the Navy stationed in the Middle East means leaving the door open to China in the Pacific—the Pentagon’s worst-case scenario. What happens if China intervenes in Taiwan while the United States is engaged in a war with Iran? This strategic tension is the key factor that determines how long the operation can be sustained.
The endurance of the aircraft carrier Ford—an 11-month deployment—is something never seen since Vietnam. The crew is exhausted. When the Bush arrives, the Ford could be moved to rest. However, capacity decreases during the transition. The deployment of the Bush in the region will take another 10 to 12 days. Ammunition depth is also a concern; GBU-57 stocks are at critical levels, the B-2 fleet is small, and there are not unlimited Tomahawks. The cost of each one is approximately $2 million. The United States is trying to reduce costs by switching to cheaper JDAMs, but this is only possible because air defense has collapsed. If Iran can rebuild its air defense in a way that Russia or China can help with, the equation changes.
And the geography of Iran—1.6 million square kilometers, the sacred mountains, deep tunnels. Finding every mobile launcher is almost impossible. The United States can destroy fixed targets. However, eliminating moving and hidden targets is much more difficult and much more expensive.
The most frequently asked question is: will the United States launch a ground operation? A large-scale invasion seems highly unlikely. The force in the region is sufficient for punitive attacks but lacks the logistics necessary for a ground operation. However, limited operations are different. The arrival of the MEU, an expeditionary unit of Marines, to the region is a sign.
The Kharg Island scenario could be on the table—an isolated island whose defenses have been largely destroyed. It is a strategic point through which 90% of Iran’s oil exports flow. On March 13, the island was bombed, but the oil facilities were not touched. An MEU conducting an amphibious landing at Kharg to secure the island would be a surgical move that would completely cut off Iran’s oil revenues. It’s not a large-scale invasion, but it’s strategically devastating.
On the other hand, ground forces could help expand the options for achieving these objectives. However, they also carry significant risks. That said, the vast majority of injuries were minor. The United States’ strategy is clear: wear bombardment. In the second phase, the objective is not to destroy Iran’s fighting capacity, but its capacity to rebuild. Missile factories, drone production facilities, component supply chains, the logistical network—everything is in the crosshairs.
Without carrying out a ground operation, the objective is to permanently paralyze the regime’s military capacity through constant pressure from the air and sea. When the Bush takes command, simultaneous operations will begin from three directions with three aircraft carriers. The Ford could be retired to rest, but the Bush will take command. The Kharg scenario with the MEU could bear fruit. The B-2s will continue to attack deep underground facilities.
Opening the Strait of Hormuz—probably the most challenging objective of this war—will require a comprehensive naval and coastal operation to secure the strait. All of Iran’s coastal defense capabilities, such as missile tunnels, fast boat bases, drone launch points, and radar stations that we have analyzed, must previously be systematically removed. Mines must be cleared, and we have detailed how the United States faces serious capacity problems in this regard.
Iran, for its part, redeploys after each attack. This is a war of attrition, but at sea.
Israel says: “At least another three weeks.”
Trump says: “It will end soon.”
Iran, for its part, says: “We will defend ourselves for as long as necessary.”
The truth is probably somewhere in between. The United States has the power to destroy Iran’s conventional capabilities; it has proven it. However, it cannot completely eliminate Iran’s geography, asymmetric determination, and underground capabilities. And it is not weapons that determine wars; it is time, determination, and cost. And who is willing to pay what price? That is what will determine the true outcome of the war. Iraq proved it. Afghanistan proved it.
