The Strait of Hormuz: A Strategic Trap
The Strait of Hormuz: Three US destroyers, the USS Truxtun, the USS Rafael Peralta, and the USS Mason, slowly navigate one of the most dangerous waterways in the world. From the Iranian coast, Revolutionary Guard commanders watch through their binoculars. The American ships look vulnerable, they look like tempting targets floating in Iran’s backyard.
However, there was something they didn’t know. This was exactly where the United States wanted them to be. In the next few minutes, Iran would make the biggest mistake in the history of its naval doctrine. As you can imagine, this was a trap. It was a trap so carefully designed that Iran fell right into it without even realizing that the door had closed behind them.
To understand how the United States Navy got Iran to voluntarily expose the network it had spent decades trying to hide, I need to show you exactly what happened.
Now look at this. The United States executed a brilliant military maneuver that forced the Islamic Republic to expose parts of its hidden naval and missile network in the Persian Gulf. As they say in the art of war, offer the enemy bait to lure him, feign disorder, and strike. This is exactly what appears to have happened in the Strait of Hormuz two days ago.
The three US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved in the May 7 confrontation—the USS Truxtun, USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason—were not simply transiting the Strait of Hormuz; they had been positioned as highly visible targets designed to provoke Iran. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, IRGC, took the bait. For Iran, the only card they have is the Strait of Hormuz.
And that’s exactly why they spent decades building this network of hidden facilities right on the coast to be able to monitor ships entering and leaving the strait and, of course, control the flow. And now this control has been significantly weakened because the United States has just destroyed something that took Iran decades to build.
In fact, if you have a little free time, you can go to satellite images on any website and see for yourselves the aftermath of this battle that took place just two days ago, especially on the Omani side, near the Strait of Hormuz. You can still see things burning, because that’s where the Revolutionary Guard boats were massacred by the Navy, the Air Force, and, of course, the United States Army. Joined.
This is a topic that is blocked in the mainstream media and on some social media platforms. YouTube’s algorithm also considers this topic risky, but I don’t care. I will continue to tell you the facts with the most accurate data.
Now, on the negotiations front, this situation has not changed at all. This is because the United States has been making concession after concession to the Iranians since the ceasefire began. The United States hoped that maybe, just maybe, Iran wanted peace and would negotiate some kind of fair agreement. But these concessions have only emboldened hardliners within Iran.
And this means that a kind of civil war is taking place inside Iran. On one side there is the Revolutionary Guard and on the other the civilian government of Iran. This is something that the New York Post reported just yesterday. Take a look at this report. While the United States maintains a fragile ceasefire, a war-hungry revolutionary guard maintains its grip on Iran.
This ugly internal power struggle in Iran is clouding mediation talks with the United States, as pro-war and pro-diplomacy factions clash over whether Iran should even accept a deal or continue the war. Until yesterday, despite all these twists and turns and the power struggle, we were hoping that Iran would respond to the latest US peace proposal, which in reality was not a peace proposal, but rather an agreement in which both sides basically agreed to negotiate for the next 30 days while the blockade was lifted and the deadline for the strait memorandum of understanding that the United States sent to Iran about three days ago was yesterday.
Last night was the time when Iran was supposed to respond to this memorandum of understanding. This was something that President Trump himself confirmed, and he specifically pointed out that the deadline for this agreement, the deadline for Iran to respond, had expired. It appears that, in fact, Iran did not respond. We have not actually received confirmation from Pakistan, the United States, or even Iran, that they have said anything.
They didn’t say no, they didn’t say yes. We’re not sure what this means. In the most optimistic sense, it could mean that the power struggle prevents Iran from reaching a decision that everyone can agree on. This is probably the most optimistic view. The most pessimistic view is that Iran has basically rejected the proposal and is ignoring the United States, so they are not even responding.
Basically, they already know how. When they talk to someone new, they realize that not responding is also a response. Well, that could be the situation. We will find out in the future, but for now we haven’t heard anything from anyone and it’s been more than 12 hours, yes, more than 12 hours since Iran was supposed to respond.
Now, yesterday President Trump also mentioned something else.
“If Iran does not respond, if they do not accept this memorandum of understanding, this would only mean that Project Freedom would be restarted; that is, US warships would begin to circulate through the Strait of Hormuz, going in and out and escorting ships leaving the Persian Gulf or those entering the Gulf so that they can load goods or oil.”
Now, even with regard to Project Freedom, there are many different narratives about why it stopped. According to the official US statement, a statement made by President Trump himself said he was pausing Project Freedom as a goodwill gesture so that the Iranians could respond to the memorandum of understanding and come to the negotiating table.
This was one of the many concessions the United States has offered since this ceasefire began. And if Iran really doesn’t respond, or if we learn that Iran hasn’t responded or has said no to the agreement, we would have to assume that the United States will return to the Freedom project. This is where I want to talk about the second narrative, and this is a narrative that we learned about through the media here in the United States.
They reported that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were not very happy that the United States announced Project Freedom without involving them. Because at the end of the day, if the United States is using these bases, the United States needs to use Saudi airspace and perhaps the airspace of other Gulf countries to ensure that they protect US warships in the Persian Gulf and other civilian vessels trying to resume normal traffic.
They need access to Saudi bases and Saudi airspace. In fact, since Saudi Arabia was not consulted about this freedom project, they had initially denied the United States permission to use the airspace and our air bases in these countries. However, one day after this report was published, it appears that Saudi Arabia made a 180-degree turn.
They were delighted to allow the United States to use the air base, especially if it was to open the Strait of Hormuz. Because, as you can imagine, all the other Gulf countries, apart from the Islamic Republic of Iran, want the Strait of Hormuz to remain open. Now, from the Iranian point of view, the US blockade is strangling the economy, but it seems that hardliners are finding ways to survive.
Annual inflation in Iran is now 50%. Food inflation is over 100%. Therefore, prices double every year. The rial continues to collapse, it has fallen to a record low and people are leaving with their money. Those who can, of course, and there’s a good reason for that. Look what the Iranian judiciary has just done.
They confiscated more than 200 properties belonging to people they accused of acting against the State. No trial, no fair hearing, nothing. People are losing their livelihoods because the regime needs money to survive. And by May 11, 2026, the picture has become much clearer. Iran is no longer just trying to control the Strait of Hormuz, but is also turning its own political destiny into a bargaining chip across this strait.
However, recent events show that Tehran is cornered in an increasingly weak position in this negotiation, because the trap the United States set in Hormuz on May 7 not only exposed Iran’s hidden coastal defense networks, but also revealed how vulnerably Tehran was playing its strait card. When the US destroyers slowly entered the strait, Iran thought it was an opportunity.
But the moment the attack began, the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems sprang into action. Launch points, drone sites, coastal missile infrastructure, and areas of concentration of attack boats were detected in real time. The network that Iran had spent years trying to hide gave itself away because of its own aggression.
Today, May 11, the diplomatic outcome of this has also come to light. According to Reuters, President Trump called Iran’s response to the US peace plan completely unacceptable. Iran’s demands included an end to the war, the lifting of sanctions, the release of Iranian assets, an end to the US naval blockade, and most importantly, recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
In other words, Tehran did not actually put forward a peace proposal, but rather an attempt to recover through diplomacy the ground he had lost in the war. Washington, for its part, rejected it. This rejection is not just a diplomatic disagreement; it is the breaking point that will determine the next phase of the war.
Because the United States is now sending the message to Iran that Hormuz is not your bargaining chip. At this point, the true center of the war returns once again to Hormuz. Iran cannot stop the US navy militarily, but it is trying to poison the strait through uncertainty, insurance risk, drone attacks, and harassment of oil tankers.
In response, the United States has established a blockade model targeting entry to and exit from Iranian ports. As we saw in the previous part of the text, US forces disabled oil tankers that were trying to return to Iran. These tankers were critically important to alleviate Iran’s storage crisis, because Iran’s need is no longer just to sell oil, but to find space to store the oil it cannot sell.
If the tankers cannot return, Iranian oil fields may have to reduce production. This means not only the loss of income today, but also permanent damage to future production capacity. The reaction of the oil markets on May 11 also confirms this stranglehold. According to Reuters, oil prices jumped again after Trump rejected Iran’s proposal.
Brent crude rose above 103. Markets are pricing in the continued closure risk and uncertainty at Hormuz. This is a very critical sign because in the early stages of the war, markets reacted to explosions; now they react to diplomatic pleas, blockade moves, and claims of sovereignty over Hormuz. In other words, Hormuz is no longer just a military strait; it has become a geopolitical valve with a direct impact on global inflation, energy security, and monetary policy.
The impact of this was also seen in the Gulf markets. According to Reuters’ May 11 market report, the Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock exchanges fell. The UAE’s air defenses intercepted two drones coming from Iran, and on the Qatari side, market pressure continued after an attack on a cargo ship.
Although the Saudi market rose slightly, this was driven by Aramco’s profits and the effort to bring the east-west pipeline to its maximum capacity. This shows us the following. The Gulf countries now interpret the threat from Iran not only as a military problem, but also as a problem of trade, finance, and energy flow. While Iran tries to pressure the United States on one hand, on the other, it reduces the Gulf’s ability to remain neutral.
The most dangerous aspect of this war lies here, in the fact that Iran claims sovereignty over Hormuz. It is not just a challenge for the United States, it is a challenge to global maritime law, the energy market, and the economic lifeline of the Gulf states. The point that Marco Rubio emphasized in his previous statements was exactly this.
“If the world accepts Iran controlling an international waterway as if it were its own property, other states in other regions will also want to apply the same model.”
Therefore, the Hormuz crisis is not just a war between Iran and the United States; it is a test of the international order’s authority over maritime routes. As Iran turns this line into a matter of sovereignty, the risk of confronting not only the United States, but the entire global trading system, increases.
On May 11, the rhetoric from the Iranian side also failed to reduce this tension. The Iranian Foreign Ministry called the US demands irrational. This statement shows that the door to diplomacy is not completely closed, but the negotiating table has become more hard. Tehran is still acting as if he wants to negotiate, but the conditions he is putting on the table are considered unacceptable by Washington, and this brings us to a very delicate point.
Iran may want the war to end, but it wants the war to end without it looking like a defeat. The United States, for its part, wants the war to end with a framework that limits the Charter of Hormuz, Iran, and its nuclear and military bargaining power. Currently, there doesn’t seem to be a real bridge between these two positions.
Meanwhile, the economic impact of the war has begun to extend beyond oil. A Reuters analysis from May 11 highlights that the closure of Hormuz could threaten not only crude oil, but even China’s electric vehicle supply chain. Because petrochemical products, plastic derivatives, energy inputs, and industrial raw materials that come from the Gulf are integrated into Asian production chains.
In other words, Iran’s maneuver in Hormuz not only increases the price of gasoline, it threatens a much broader industrial network, from battery production to logistics and from freight to insurance. For this reason, the new phase of the war is much bigger than the phrase “oil war”. This is a global supply chain war.
For Iran, the biggest paradox at this point is the following. By closing Hormuz, he is trying to put pressure on the United States and the West, but the same move also puts pressure on his own oil buyers like China and India. If Chinese oil tankers are attacked, if tankers linked to Iran are seized, if transit rules in the strait become ambiguous, for Beijing, Iranian oil ceases to be cheap and becomes risky.
The price of a barrel may be low, but the risk of transportation, the cost of insurance, and the risk of sanctions make that discount pointless. That is why, although Iran’s strategy in Hormuz raises prices in the short term, in the long term it scares away its own customer base and this erodes Tehran’s biggest economic pillar in his hands.
Furthermore, as of May 11, the controversy over the oil spill has not yet ended. Iran has denied claims of a major oil spill near Kharg Island. However, satellite images reportedly show a large stain in the area. This issue has not yet been confirmed, but even suspicion is enough because while Iran’s storage capacity is reduced, while tankers are blocked and port operations are under pressure, any oil slick seen around Kharg is interpreted by the market as a sign that the system is under strain, further damaging Iran’s image as a reliable oil supplier.
In conclusion, as of May 11, 2026, the war has reached a new threshold. Iran’s response to the US proposal was rejected. The claim of sovereignty over Hormuz was not accepted by Washington. Oil prices rose, and Gulf markets became tense. The risk of drone and ship attacks on the UAE-Qatar route continued.
The US blockade continues to stifle Iran’s oil tankers, its storage space, and its oil revenues. Tehran, for his part, is trying to respond by generating uncertainty, not with military power. But uncertainty is not an unlimited weapon either, because as uncertainty drags on, everyone moves away from Iran: tanker owners back off, insurance companies back off, Chinese buyers act cautiously, and Gulf countries expand their defenses.
The United States makes the blockade even more systematic, and finally Hormuz, which Iran calls its only card, ceases to be an advantage in the regime’s hands and becomes a mechanism that strangles its own economy. The point we have reached today is exactly this. Iran wanted to use Hormuz as a weapon against the world, but what is evident from May 11th onwards is the following.
The barrel of that weapon is now also pointed at Iran’s economy. And the question that will determine the next phase of the war is the following: Will Iran really be able to control this strait, or will Hormuz become the biggest strategic trap in which the Tehran regime has fallen by its own hands?
