“At times, the possible imminent agreement between the United States and Iran has captured all the attention. Delivery of enriched uranium, full opening of the Strait of Hormuz, completion of the nuclear program and even a possible extension of the Abraham Accords. In the last few hours, the White House has leaked all sorts of versions to justify that the withdrawal agreement is a great deal, something about which skepticism is growing.”
“And once again time began to pass and we soon came face to face with the same reality that has become commonplace in recent weeks. And Iran just won’t give in. Friends, the latest leaks basically pointed to a 60-day extension of the ceasefire, rewarding Iran for it with the release of funds and without getting much in return, because in Tehran they say that it is not yet the time to negotiate the nuclear program and that opening Hormuz is one thing and giving up its control is quite another.”
“And of course, suddenly everything turned black for the White House. Israel leaked that the agreement as it was being proposed was unacceptable, and a lot of Republicans were outraged. Within hours of the anticipated triumphalism, an endless stream of criticism swept through the country. Friends, we don’t know what the hell will ultimately happen, whether there will be an agreement or not.”
“Here at Visual Politic we’ve already told you that with all this mess, Washington has gotten itself into a kind of trap from which there is no good way out. An agreement may be signed in the next few hours, or it may not. In any case, what we do know is that Iran is not giving up, that the Ayatollahs do not seem desperate, that they believe they hold the upper hand to some extent, and that if there is an agreement, they want to profit from it.”
“For now, Donald Trump has asked for patience and his team is trying to contain the damage. And well, the truth is that in the last few hours the Iranians themselves have said that there are many points of agreement. Of course, doubts are on the table, and practically three months after the war began, Washington’s situation is becoming increasingly complicated.”
“Yes, the United States, together with Israel, carried out a relentless air campaign, destroying thousands upon thousands of targets and taking out a good part of the Iranian leadership and also many of their arsenals. The problem, as you all know, is that this did not manage to bring down or slow down the Ayatollahs, who still maintain many missile and drone capabilities available.”
“And they do so while time passes, the strait remains closed to calicanto, and the international economic situation becomes more complicated every day. Oil, gas, fuel, helium, sulfuric acid, nitrogen fertilizers, and countless production chains are under brutal strain. And the question is, why on earth can’t the United States bring the Hayatollahs to their knees? What are the blind spots in Trump’s strategy? What cards do the men in black turbans have left?”
“Friends, the war in Iran is about to reach 100 days of conflict. Long gone is the initial triumphalism in Washington with that legendary press conference by Pitt Hesset, publicly humiliating the ayatollahs and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard after the ceasefire was agreed. Something that, incidentally, nobody understood. Iran’s leadership is in no better shape.”
“Desperate and hiding, they’ve gone underground. Cowering, that’s what rats do. And now the problem is that neither the Republican colleagues in the administration nor Benjamin Netanyahu himself are entirely convinced that the American president is pushing the regime towards a genuine defeat, something that deeply irritates Donald.”
“It hasn’t even been fully negotiated yet, so don’t listen to the losers criticizing something they know nothing about. Unlike those who came before me and who should have resolved this problem many years ago, I don’t make bad deals.”
“And friends, the question is, why are so many supposed allies of the president now drawing their knives and questioning his plan? What has set off all the alarms? The thing is, it’s been leaked that the plan to extend the ceasefire for 60 days would include things like allowing Iran to openly sell its oil, easing many of the sanctions against the country, and unfreezing all or at least some of the frozen funds. And keep in mind that we’re talking about a fund of up to 100 billion dollars. So even if only a small part of this immense fortune were released, the economic boost would be more than considerable. And of course, the unfettered sale of oil would give the regime billions of dollars more, which, as I say, would be a very, very considerable economic boost for the Ayatollahs’ system.”
“In 2015, when Tehran reached an agreement with the Obama administration and sanctions were eased, the Persian country’s GDP soared by 7.5%. And now the more optimistic circles within the regime are convinced that, thanks to the enormous leverage provided by having the Strait of Hormuz closed, they can achieve a better agreement.”
“In other words, a genuine lifeline that could allow the country to rebuild and restore all its military capabilities. And be warned, because that’s not all. White House leaks suggested that in exchange the Hormuz Strait would be opened, but the Iranians quickly qualified that. Yes, the Hormuz Strait would open to navigation, but always under the control and management of the new authority created by the Revolutionary Guard to manage precisely the passage through this critical point, which could ultimately entail tolls or payments to guarantee faster passage now or in the future, i.e., billions more.”
“And look, the Iranian foreign minister has said that, well, they wouldn’t establish tolls now, but of course, there are two problems here: now doesn’t mean the future. And secondly, what the foreign minister says, well, is usually worth very little if it is not corroborated by the Revolutionary Guard.”
“And furthermore, there is an important detail that we need to take into account. In Iran they say that for now they are not talking about tolls, but that they do not rule out establishing fees for services. Different concept, same purpose. In any case, on an economic level, and even politically, the agreement that seems to be being negotiated could be a major coup for the Iranian regime.”
“But what on earth do the deserted ones offer in return for all this? So, let the Strait be partially reopened, thus alleviating the enormous crisis that is brewing in many production chains. I repeat, partially because it would still be under the control of the authority created to manage this strait, with or without tolls.”
“And they would also begin to negotiate on the nuclear program, which is basically what they were already doing before Trump gave the order to begin the bombings on February 28. Furthermore, Trump’s inner circle also suggests that this would be accompanied by an expansion of the Abraham Accords, through which countries like Saudi Arabia or even Qatar could come to recognize Israel.”
“This, of course, would be a way of trying to appease Netanyahu. The problem is that it is not clear whether the Arab countries are willing to do so, nor that this is sufficient compensation in exchange for strengthening Iran economically and politically. But how on earth did we get here? So, if you like, friends, let’s take a little trip down memory lane to put things in order.”
“The months leading up to Operation Epic Fury were extremely complicated for Iran’s theocratic regime. The deep and endless economic crisis and the brutal drought that the country was going through were the last straw and 2026 arrived with massive protests throughout the country. The regime, as you surely remember, unleashed its iron fist, causing a massacre.”
“But this is how Iran was experiencing what many analysts called a silent invasion, that is, a civil society that was advancing little by little through scattered and difficult-to-control daily actions. We’re talking about a growing and widespread rejection of the government, challenges to the dress code at unauthorized social gatherings, and things like that.”
“The Iranians were protesting more and more and showing less and less loyalty to the government, even, as I say, despite the enormous massacres we witnessed. Well, it was precisely in that context that the White House believed it saw a window of opportunity. At least that’s how it seems, that’s the narrative Netanyahu put on the table for the US president, who bought it without hesitation.”
“And with these attacks, Mossad was moving to fuel a general uprising that would deliver the final blow to the system, which he saw as a house of cards. However, nothing could be further from the truth. What happened was precisely the opposite. The fear of bombings caused Iranian society to flee the cities and take refuge, and to stay off the streets.”
“On the other hand, many of the attacks, especially those against economic infrastructure and in cities, not to mention such horrific errors as the Tomahawks attack on a school where more than 150 girls lost their lives, logically began to cool criticism of the regime because suddenly many Iranians did not think what was coming from abroad was any better.”
“Add to that the propaganda and you’ll understand how things were. And of course, in parallel, the regime has already eliminated any limits to repression. Checkpoints were established, mass registrations began, etc., etc., etc. Iran accelerates executions of prisoners under the cover of war. A US-based human rights organization focused on Iran says more than 600 people have been executed in Iran since the beginning of the year.”
“The result, in terms of social and political control, is that the regime has not only weakened, but in many cases has even strengthened. Furthermore, the American-Israeli attack has created a kind of psychological drug composed of politics, religion, and a narrative of hate that has caused the security forces themselves to become entrenched.”
“To the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the armed forces and all of you, he asked the Iranian security forces and their leaders to collaborate to overthrow the regime, but no one responded, or rather, they did so in a way contrary to what they expected in Washington.”
“Instead of breaking ranks, the Revolutionary Guard, the most ideologically driven and powerful core of the Iranian security apparatus, advanced on the rest of the factions. It prevailed, and not only that, but control of this same body passed into the hands of more radical leaders, such as its current commander Agmach Bajibi, a man belonging to the most radical wing of the regime who hates the West with all his might and who is precisely an expert in insurgent warfare and terrorism.”
“Come on, the best of the best. Following the death of Khamenei and other cabinet members, the commanders of the revolutionary guard gained room to rise in the chain of command. The clearest case is that of Mochtaba Khamenei himself. A figure was imposed by the hardliners of the regime. At least 53 high-ranking officials in the Iranian chain of command lost their lives during the bombings.”
“And friends, practically all of them were replaced by much tougher and more radical profiles. We’re not talking about guys who are exactly desperate to reach an agreement at any price, starting with the fact that they know that if they don’t leave everything very, very well tied up, it’s only a matter of time before they end up like their predecessors.”
“In other words, although it may seem paradoxical, resisting is perhaps their best life insurance. And let’s not forget that we are talking about an eminently theocratic system. So in summary, for these new leaders, religious, ideological, and survival factors play a crucial role that explains the resistance of the Ayatollahs. The bigwigs are convinced that this is the only way to guarantee their lives and also the continuation of the Islamic revolution.”
“And watch out, friends, because the war has become something more. It also presents an opportunity to expand and deepen their mechanisms of control and repression over the country. And well, the advance of the Revolutionary Guard is not even limited to the political-military sphere. It also reaches something much deeper: the very economy of the Persian country.”
“Pay attention. For two decades, the Revolutionary Guard has been trying to expand its network of economic, political, and industrial power. This involves gaining access to public companies, holding high-ranking government positions, and reducing the influence of the army and the more professional branches of the armed forces.”
“Well, now they are achieving many of these goals. The hardliners in the regime have gained much more complete control over the military chain. They have acquired more control over the military industry, greater influence in strategic decision-making, and greater dominance over all security forces. And note that this is not just a matter of economic control; the empowerment of the Revolutionary Guard makes it much more likely that Iran’s regional armed wings, from Hezbollah onward, will never operate again. In fact, part of the complexity of the war was due to the chaos that these groups could cause in Lebanon, Iraq, and other sensitive points in the Middle East.”
“And of course, this is a loose end that generates a lot of distrust. An agreement that is perceived as allowing Iran to survive and possess the ability to control the strait in the future will put Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiite militias in Iraq on steroids.”
“Friends, at this point, we are not going to deny that Iran has paid a very high price for its ironclad resistance. It is clear that the punishment they have suffered has been immense, but from another perspective, the war has also opened opportunities to revitalize the regime, renew it and establish a new lever of international influence, Hormuz.”
“This is what they miscalculated very badly in the White House and in the Netanyahu government, and now we are all paying the price. And their latest strategy, the economic pulse, isn’t working out too well for them either. Yes, Iran has certainly had to reduce its crude oil exports, but its storage capacity still gives it room to sustain a minimum level of production, and the country still has a lot of experience when it comes to well management, which tells us that once again Washington may have underestimated the economic resilience of the fundamentalists who control Tehran.”
“For example, in late April, Trump went so far as to suggest that, well, that Iran had been struggling a few days before its oil system completely collapsed and that this would force them to give in. However, many analysts now believe that Tehran could hold out for quite some time longer, even though it’s no longer April.”
“And of course, all this is happening while the international situation is getting more complicated every day, not to mention that what these guys are probably most worried about is not exactly an internal crisis. Russia, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran have been demonstrating for years that an economic crisis can erode an entire country without completely breaking its ruling elite.”
“Because with a political police force terrorizing the population and an increasingly radicalized internal military force, the real cost to the leadership may be much smaller than they imagine in Washington. Friends, Tehran has his own cards, as you can see, and he’s playing them. Yes, everything points to the White House being eager to finally overcome this nightmare, but the problem is that it’s not worth doing at any cost, and for now many of its partners have already gone for the jugular as soon as they saw a preliminary agreement that the world basically interpreted as what it is: in a way, a retreat, because any agreement that doesn’t end Iran’s nuclear program and pave the way for regime change will be perceived as a failure by the opportunist.”
“And mind you, not because the Republican Party or Netanyahu himself are overly demanding, but basically because it was the president himself who sowed this narrative and because under any other scenario it is also not well understood what the hell all this has been for.”
“But of course, the point is that the Iranians know this, just as they know that JPMorgan is already sounding the alarm. If the energy supply is not restored soon, international reserves will come under severe strain starting this June and will reach near operational collapse for many of them from September onwards.”
“And be aware that it will take quite some time from when it reopens until normal supply is restored. And to top it all off, the Iranians also know something else: that summer is the time of highest fuel consumption of the entire year in the United States, and that there are elections in 2026. As a result, they believe the pressure will increase exponentially for Trump and they want to take advantage of it.”
“Friends, the US president is in a complicated situation and all this explains why the hell it’s so difficult to reach a substantial agreement. But having said that, the question is now for you. What do you think will be the final outcome of this power struggle? How much longer can Iran resist while it wears down Washington’s patience? Leave your opinions below in the comments. Let’s debate.”
